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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the existence and extent of downward nominal wage rigidities in the Mexican
labor market using data from the administrative records of the Mexican Social Security Institute
(IMSS). This longitudinal, firm-level dataset allows us to track workers employed with the same
firm, observe their wage profiles and calculate the nominal-wage changes they experience over time.
Based on the estimated density functions of nominal wage changes and other moments of the
distribution, we are able to calculate several standard tests of nominal wage rigidity that have been
proposed in the literature.  Furthermore, we extend these tests to take into account the presence of
minimum wage laws that may affect the distribution of nominal wage changes.  The densities and
tests calculated using these date are similar to those obtained using administrative data from other
countries, and constitute a significant improvement over the measures of nominal wage rigidities
obtained from household survey data.  We find considerably more wage rigidity than previous
estimates obtained for Mexico using data from the National Urban Employment Survey suggest.
Furthermore, we find evidence that the extent of nominal wage rigidities has been falling over time.
We also document the importance of minimum wages in the Mexican labor market, as evidenced
by the large fraction of minimum wage earners and the widespread indexation of wage changes to
the minimum wage increases.  
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There is a growing consensus about the importance of labor regulations in 
determining the productivity of labor itself as well as total factor productivity. Thus, the 
effect of certain types of labor regulations may well extend beyond the traditional 
deadweight losses associated with taxation implied by static partial equilibrium models. 
This consensus is emerging at the crossroad of two strands of the literature. 
 
According to the first strand, the existence of certain types of labor regulations may act as 
a barrier to the adoption of new technologies and best organizational practices, which can 
adversely affect total factor productivity (TFP) and thus per capita income. In particular, 
Parente and Prescott (1994, 1999, 2000) and Prescott (1998) have argued theoretically, 
and shown in a series of case studies, that regulations —including labor-market 
policies— can effectively block the adoption of more productive technologies and better 
organizational methods. Since differences in per capita income across countries are 
accounted for by differences in total factor productivity, these regulations or “barriers to 
riches” are at the center of the development theory they propose to explain relative per 
capita income levels.  
 
The second strand of the literature is mainly empirical, and uses establishment- and firm-
level data to decompose the growth in total factor productivity into different sources (see, 
for example, Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2000 and 2002), Griliches and Regev 
(1995), Haltiwanger (2000), Oley and Pakes (1996)). According to these decompositions, 
growth in TFP can occur within existing firms (with firms increasing their factor 
productivity through the adoption of new technologies and better organizational 
practices), through resource reallocation across firms (with resources reallocated from 
less productive to more productive firms), or through the entry and exit of firms with 
different levels of total factor productivity (with less productive firms exiting the market 
and more productive firms entering the market).  
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The analysis of productivity growth occurring through the reallocation of resources 
across firms, industries and sectors or through the entry and exit of firms has received a 
great thrust from the availability of new longitudinal datasets at the firm or establishment 
level. These analyses reveal several important facts (see Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh 
(1996), Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) and Haltiwanger (2000)). First, there is a lot more 
reallocation of resources across firms and industries at any point during the business 
cycle than the aggregate net statistics would suggest. Second, much of the growth in 
productivity occurs through reallocation between firms and industries and through the 
entry and exit of firms, rather than through productivity growth within existing firms. 
Thus, to the extent that rigidities or inefficiencies introduced by bankruptcy and labor 
laws or other regulations prevent the reallocation of labor and other resources to their 
most efficient uses, productivity growth may be seriously hindered. 
 
A recent contribution that is at the intersection of these two strands of the literature is 
Lagos (2004), who builds a model where the level of aggregate TFP is an explicit 
function of the economic environment in general (including, for example, the firm-level 
technology and the distribution of shocks), and labor-market policies in particular. 
According to this model, labor-market policies affect the job creation and job destruction 
decisions and thus the productivity composition of active firms. Since the level of TFP is 
related to the average productivity of active firms, labor-market policies can increase or 
reduce the aggregate level of TFP in an economy.  
 
While theory and evidence are increasingly pointing to the importance of a market that 
allows for unimpeded adjustments to labor, policies have lagged behind. From an 
economic policy standpoint, the implementation of a labor market reform to attain greater 
flexibility has been outstanding for the past two decades in Mexico and other Latin 
American countries (see Lustig and Edwards (1997) and Pagés and Heckman (2003)). 
The majority of the labor regulations in Latin America date back to the first half of the 
twentieth century, and have experienced only minor reforms since. While some countries 
in the region have adopted measures to increase the flexibility of their labor markets, 
these attempts have been halfhearted. The issue of labor reform has become even more   3
pressing in light of the increase in international competition from China and other South 
East Asian countries, most of which have “at will” hiring and firing policies and thus 
very flexible labor markets. As the macroeconomic environment has become more stable 
and inflation gradually converges to the levels of developed countries, the typical 
clearing mechanism in the labor market —according to which unanticipated increases in 
inflation induced sharp decreases in real wages— is no longer available.  
 
In this paper we focus on two particular types of labor regulations which may give rise to 
inefficiencies in the allocation of labor both within the firm and across firms, industries 
and sectors: nominal-wage rigidities and minimum wages. The existence and extent of 
downward nominal wage rigidities has given rise to one of the longest standing debates in 
macroeconomics. Many macroeconomic models postulate the existence of such rigidities, 
and their results crucially hinge on this assumption since the effects of monetary policy 
largely depend on their existence and magnitude. Despite this debate, there is surprisingly 
little empirical evidence on their existence and magnitude (for exceptions, see 
Castellanos (2003), Card and Hyslop (1997), Crawford and Wright (2001), Dwyer and 
Leong (2000), Farès and Hogan (2000), Faruqui (2000), Kahn (1997), Lebow, Saks and 
Wilson (2003), and Wilson (2002)). While most of the literature on downward nominal 
wage rigidities has focused on their implications for the conduct of monetary policy, it is 
possible, as will be argued below, that the effects of these rigidities extend to other areas 
of the economy. We also analyze the interaction of downward nominal wage rigidities 
and minimum wages, an issue which has not been analyzed before and which is 
potentially important in Latin American countries, where the fraction of minimum wage 
earners is high relative to more developed economies and the practice of indexing wage 
changes to the minimum wage increases is pervasive. 
 
The issue of downward nominal wage rigidity in Mexico is particularly interesting for at 
least four reasons. First, the Mexican economy has undergone a remarkable process of 
economic liberalization during the past two decades, including a major shift in openness 
to trade and foreign investment. This fact should imply a greater need to reallocate labor 
across firms, industries and sectors increased relative to the period when the economy   4
was closed. Second, the process of disinflation that the Mexican economy has undergone 
during the past two decades, and the resulting stabilization of nominal variables, may 
have increased the importance of nominal wage rigidities. Thus, while nominal wage 
rigidities may not have been relevant for firms during the period of high inflation when 
real wage declined even in the absence of nominal wage decreases, the current 
environment of low and stable inflation makes this feature potentially binding. Third, in 
contrast to many countries where downward nominal wage rigidity may be an artefact of 
a person’s perception that a nominal-wage decrease is “unfair”, in Mexico the law 
specifically forbids nominal wage cuts (see Federal Labor Law (LFT), Article 51). Thus, 
while for most countries it remains an open question why nominal wages do not adjust 
downwards to help clear the labor market during recessions (see Bewley (1999)), it is less 
of a puzzle in Mexico since this provision is part of the legal framework. Fourth, the 
nominal wage rigidities imbedded in the current legislation may interact with other 
regulations in the law such as minimum wages, mandated benefits and other restrictions 
such as firing costs, since a firm that complies with one regulation is very likely to 
comply with all other regulations. Furthermore, the firms that typically comply with the 
regulations tend to be the large industrial firms, many of which are among the most 
productive in the economy.  
 
Another important issue in our paper is the analysis of the effects of minimum wages in 
the Mexican labor market. Minimum wages in Mexico might have different effects than 
in other countries due to the high fraction of minimum-wage earners and the common 
practice in the Mexican economy of indexing wages changes and other contracts —
including administrative fees, fines, an even mortgage payments— to minimum wage 
increases. Our analysis confirms the importance of minimum wages in Mexico, as shown 
by the high fraction of minimum-wage earners and the indexation of wage changes to the 
minimum wage increases. Thus, the minimum wage is as a key variable in the Mexican 
economy through the influence that increases in the minimum wage exert on other price 
changes. 
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The main contribution of this paper is to bring together the measurement of downward 
nominal wage rigidity and the rigidities introduced by the existence of minimum wage 
laws in a unified and coherent framework. In particular, the present analysis provides 
evidence on the existence and extent of downward nominal wage rigidity in the Mexican 
economy using data from the administrative records of the Mexican Social Security 
Institute (IMSS). This dataset is similar to the establishment-level dataset used by Lebow, 
Saks and Wilson (2003) for the U.S., making the results more comparable between the 
two countries. In order to test for the existence and magnitude of DNWRs, this paper 
calculates several standard measures and tests proposed in the literature. Furthermore, it 
modifies the tests proposed by Kahn (1997) to account for the possible effect of a large 
fraction of minimum wage earners and widespread indexation of nominal wage changes 
to the minimum wage increases. By using data from the IMSS administrative records 
developed and used by Kaplan, Martínez and Robertson (2003a and 2003b) to analyze 
worker and job flows and employment displacement costs, we are able to obtain very 
accurate measures of nominal wages and nominal-wage changes. Thus, this paper greatly 
improves upon the previous evidence reported by Castellanos (2003) on nominal wage 
rigidity in Mexico using household survey data. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first time that tests on nominal wage rigidities have been obtained for a developing 
county using this type of data, and the first time that the standard tests of nominal wage 
rigidities have been modified to explicitly incorporate the effects of the minimum wages 
simultaneously. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews in more detail the 
literature on nominal wage rigidity, while section 3 describes the data used in the paper. 
Section 4 describes an overview of the institutional and legal framework that regulates 
labor in Mexico. Section 5 presents some simple statistics. Section 6 describes the 
econometric models we estimate and presents our main results. Finally, Section 7 
summarizes the main findings of the paper. 
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2. Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity (DNWR) 
 
The empirical literature on Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity  (DNWR), despite the 
obvious importance of the issue for the conduct of monetary policy, has received 
relatively little attention until recently. The first generation of studies were based on 
microeconomic data on wages from household survey, such as the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) or the Current Population Survey (CPS), and focused on establishing 
the existence and extent of DNWR (see Altonji and Devereux (1999), Card and Hyslop 
(1997), Castellanos (2003), Dweyer and Leong (2000), Kahn (1997) and McLaughlin 
(1994, 1999)).
1 More recently, this literature has shifted from using household survey 
panel data to using establishment- or firm-level panel data from administrative record, 
such as the data used in the calculation of the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Employment 
Cost Index (ECI) (see Lebow, Saks and Wilson (2003)). The advantage of the second 
generation of studies is that they are based on more accurate measures of wages since 
they are obtained from administrative records and not from self-reported household 
surveys. Even more accurate measures of wages and wage changes have been obtained 
using data for a small, non-random sample of firms that track both jobs and individuals 
(see Wilson (2002)). The current state of this literature can be summarized as follows: as 
the accuracy of the data on wages has progressively increased through the use of better 
datasets, more evidence on the existence of significant DNWR has been found. 
 
The detection of nominal wage rigidities usually begins by estimating the probability 
density functions of wage changes over consecutive periods (typically a year) using 
longitudinal data on individual workers or jobs. The existence of DNWR is then first 
established through analyzing the shape of the density functions as well as through 
estimating certain moments of the distributions. To the extent that wages exhibit 
DNWRs, the estimated densities should be asymmetric (right skewed), with few 
observations corresponding to negative wage changes and much of the density’s mass 
                                                 
1 A notable exception is Bewley (1999), who analyzes the causes of nominal wage rigidities through a 
series of extensive interviews with key labor market participants in the some labor markets in the 
Northeastern U.S.   7
piled up at zero, reflecting the fact that negative wage changes are legally or   
institutionally prohibited. The analysis is then formalized through the estimation of 
sample statistics and measures of DNWR, such as those proposed by Kahn (1997), 
Lebow, Stockton and Wascher (1995) and Lebow, Saks and Wilson (2003). In general, 
these measures try to compare the actual distribution of nominal wage changes with a 
hypothetical distribution of nominal wages under no rigidities (see below for a 
description of some of these tests). 
 
The only evidence on downward nominal wage rigidities for the case of Mexico is by 
Castellanos (2003), who estimates a series of standard measures of DNWR using 
microdata from the National Urban Employment Survey (or ENEU for its acronym in 
Spanish) for the period 1994-2001. In particular, this study exploits the rotating panel 
structure of the ENEU data, which tracks workers over five consecutive quarters, in order 
to estimate distributions of wage changes. Since there is no way of knowing from the data 
whether an individual remains employed with the same firm over any two consecutive 
quarters, it is assumed that a worker who is employed in the same economic sector and 
has the same position and occupation over consecutive periods is employed with the 
same firm. The data on nominal wages come from self reported wages, and is thus likely 
to be measured with error. Both of these drawbacks when using household survey data 
imply that the extent of nominal wage rigidity is likely to be underestimated, since 
workers who are wrongly classified as job stayers will appear as having experienced a 
nominal wage change, and some of the measurement error in wages will be attributed to 
wage flexibility. 
 
The results in Castellanos (2003) suggest that, according to the estimated densities of 
wage changes and from standard measures of DNWR, including those proposed by Kahn 
(1997), Lebow, Stockton and Wascher (1995), and Lebow, Saks and Wilson (2003), 
nominal wages in Mexico exhibit few rigidities when compared to other countries. Only 
for a small number of industries (large, formal firms) there is evidence of substantial 
nominal wage rigidities. Unfortunately, the estimations reported are not directly 
comparable to those obtained using data from administrative records for other countries   8
(such as Lebow, Saks and Wilson (2003) for the U.S., or Dweyer and Leong (2000) for 
Australia), since there is no way of knowing with certainty if workers actually remained 
employed with the same firm, there is no uniform measure of wages such as wage per 






The data used in this paper come from the administrative records of the Mexican Social 
Security Institute, or Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS). These administrative 
records constitute a unique database of all the private-sector firms affiliated with the 
IMSS and their employees. Although this type of longitudinal, establishment-level 
database has been used for academic purposes in other countries, such as in the U.S. and 
several European countries, this is one of the few database of its kind for a developing 
country.  
 
It is important to stress that these data come from the actual records used by IMSS to 
administer the social security system; thus, they were not originally intended for use as a 
public database. In fact, this information only became amenable to statistical analysis 
after Kaplan, Martínez and Robertson (2000a and 2000b) gained access, cleaned and 
processed the administrative records. The number of employees ranges from roughly 5 
million in the middle 1980s to roughly 12 million in recent years. It is also important to 
highlight that the database is not a representative sample of all firms in the country, but 
rather a census of all formal (i.e., legally established with the Mexican Social Security 
Institute) firms, their establishments and their employees. 
 
The Social Security Law and its accompanying code establish that every private-sector 
employer has the legal obligation to affiliate each of their employees with the IMSS.
2 
                                                 
2 All definitions and regulations regarding the registration of employers and their employees to the IMSS 
are contained in the Social Security Law (Ley del Seguro Social, or LSS) and its accompanying code 
(Reglamento de la Ley del Seguro Social en material de afiliación, clasificación de empresas, recaudación y 
fiscalización).    9
Every affiliated firm is given an employer register number (Registro Patronal) for each 
county (municipio) in which the firm has an establishment or plant. If a firm has multiple 
establishments or plants within a county, it will have a single register for them as long as 
all establishments and plants are in the same sector of activity. Thus, firms can have 
multiple registers depending on the number of establishments they have in different 
municipalities, and can also have multiple registers within a municipality if the 
establishments or plants are dedicated to different activities. Once affiliated with the 
IMSS, each employees is assigned a unique social security number (Número de 
Seguridad Social), which has recently began to be replaced by a unique personal 
identification number (Clave Única de Registro de Población). 
 
Wage in the IMSS data are reported in a standardized measure, called the base salary 
(salario base de cotización, or SBC). The SBC is a comprehensive measure of wage plus 
benefits, including payments made in cash, bonuses, premiums, room and board, 
commissions, benefits in kind and any other amount paid or benefit received. The SBC is 
also standardized in the sense that it is reported as a daily wage, even if the employees are 
paid on a weekly, fortnightly or monthly basis. Employers are also obliged to report the 
number of hours and number of days worked, and social security contributions are paid 
monthly and calculated based on the daily SBC and the number of days worked per 
month. We do not, however, have access to information on hours or days worked. 
Employers have the legal obligation to report to the IMSS, within the next five working 
days, if any of the following occurs: suspension, resumption, termination, or change of 
activities; change in name, registry or address; and any change in the SBC of any worker. 
In sum, the SBC is a comprehensive measure of wages plus benefits which is consistent 
over time and is required to be continually updated by firms when it suffers any change.  
 
It is important to underscore that the SBC is capped below at the minimum wage in the 
corresponding geographic area of each establishment, and is currently capped at 25 times 
the minimum daily wage prevalent in Mexico City for all establishments. The cap was at 
10 times the minimum wage prior to 1995. While a large fraction of the workers affiliated 
to the IMSS earn exactly the minimum wage (11.7% in 2002 according to official IMSS   10
statistics), only a small share are capped above (2.3% in 2002). In order to insure that 
none of the results in this paper are not driven by this feature of the data, we repeated all 
estimations with and without the groups of workers whose base wage is capped below 
and above. 
 
Regarding the accuracy of the SBC, it is important to note that employers have an 
incentive to underreport base wages in order to lower the social security contributions 
they pay. Employees, on the other hand, have no incentive to underreport wages since 
many of the benefits they receive are proportional the base wage their employees report 
to the IMSS. Thus, unless workers are appropriately compensated in cash by their 
employers for the decrease in benefits, they will not agree with a decrease in the wage 
reported to the IMSS.
3 Although there are incentives for employers to underreport wages, 
the IMSS has been accorded the legal status of autonomous fiscal authority. This implies 
that it can engage in coercive actions to collect contributions —including seizing firm’s 
assets—, which greatly enhance its ability to enforce the law.  
 
The administrative data from the IMSS records offer several advantages over existing 
household survey datasets such as the National Urban Employment Survey (ENEU), 
which make the calculations obtained using administrative data more reliable. First, with 
the administrative records it is known with certainty whether a worker remains employed 
with the same firm over time, since there are unique individual codes that identify 
establishments (Registro Patronal) and workers (Número de Seguridad Social or Clave 
Única de Registro de Población). In contrast, with household survey data one has to 
assume that a worker who is employed in the same economic sector, position and 
occupation over consecutive periods is employed with the same firm, although there is 
actually no information in the questionnaire that could help identify an individual firm. 
                                                 
3 For example, in case of disability the insurance is based on a replacement rate of 100% of the base salary 
while the disability lasts, and 70% of the base salary if the disability is permanent. In case of illness, the 
health insurance is based on a replacement rate of 60% of the base salary while the illness lasts (up to 52 
weeks). In case of maternity, the insurance is based on a replacement rate of 100% of the base salary for 42 
days before and after giving birth. In the case of the retirement insurance, and old-age unemployment and 
old-age insurance (Cesantía en Edad Avanzada y Vejez), employer plus employee contributions are equal 
to 2% and 4.175% of the base salary, respectively. Since these contributions are deposited in an individual 
retirement account, there is a strong linkage between contributions and future benefits.   11
This method evidently does not precludes the possibility that workers may have switched 
jobs but remained in the same sector, position and occupation. If this is the case, one 
would classify a worker as a job stayer while in fact he would be a job mover. Second, as 
stressed above, the definition of base wages reported in the administrative data (salario 
base de cotización) is consistent over time and, given that they are the wages on which 
employers pay payroll taxes, they are less prone to be measured with error.
4 In contrast, 
the data on wages from household surveys are typically measured with error since they 
are based on self-reported wages.  
 
On the other hand, the drawback of administrative records relative to household survey 
data is that they include a very limited set of information on individual and firm 
characteristics that could be used as covariates. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this 
paper, which is to analyze nominal wage rigidities for those workers who remain 
employed with the same firm over a period of time, the two advantages highlighted 
before far outweigh the drawback of having limited information on individual 
characteristics. 
 
In this paper we use quarterly observations for the period 1985-2001. In particular, for 
each quarter we calculated the nominal wage changes over the previous year for all 
workers who remained employed with the same firm and then extracted a random sample 
of 500,000 workers on the following dates: March 31, June 30, September 30, and 
December 31. That is, we extract data from the last day of each quarter. The ability to 
know exactly to what date the wage observations refer to is of crucial importance for our 
ability to incorporate an analysis of minimum wages into the work. Minimum wages are 
often changed multiple times in a year (particularly in years with high inflation), and the 
dates of these changes can vary from year to year. Since we know the exact dates of the 
wage measurements, we know exactly which minimum-wage regime was applicable to 
each wage observation. 
                                                 
4 In fact, the SBC is a standard measure of wage plus benefits which corresponds closely to the measure of 
total compensation from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Employment Cost Survey used by Lebow, Saks 
and Wilson (2003). In this sense our results are comparable to theirs, except for the fact that the ECS 
follows jobs rather than persons.   12
 
 
4. Institutional Features of the Mexican Labor Market 
 
The Mexican labor legislation is characterized, as in many other Latin American 
countries, by generous mandated benefits and a high level of job protection. At the same 
time, the labor market is characterized by a high degree of non-compliance with these 
labor laws and regulations, as reflected in the high share of workers that in fact do not 
receive some or any of the mandated benefits. In Mexico, the main labor laws mandate 
that employers should comply with several regulations, provisions and restrictions, 
including minimum wages, minimum age of employment, maximum length of the 
working day, overtime pay, social security contributions, severance payments, seniority 
premia, maternity leave, on-the-job training provisions and non-discrimination policies, 
among others. There is even a provision unique to Mexico that mandates employers to 
share profits with their employees (reparto de utilidades). 
 
According to several measures of labor legislation flexibility (in hiring, in firing, and in 
working conditions), Mexico is one of the countries with the most rigid labor laws in the 
world (see Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shliefer (2003)). In contrast, 
Mexico’s main trading partners and closest foreign competitors, including the U.S., 
Canada and most South East Asian countries, have a highly flexible labor market, with 
few if any impediments to how labor is allocated within or between firms. This fact 
evidently places Mexico at a disadvantage relative to these countries. One reason why 
this fact could be ignored in the past is that real wages in Mexico displayed a remarkable 
degree of downward flexibility, which provided much of the correction needed to regain 
competitiveness. This adjustment in wages typically came through unexpected increases 
in inflation. At any rate, the adjustment mechanism afforded by real wage flexibility is no 
longer available in the current environment of low and stable inflation. Thus, flexibility 
in the labor market will have to come from some other source. 
 
Labor legislation in Mexico is extremely detailed and complicated, since it is contained in 
several laws and in thousands of articles. It is also outdated. The Constitution dates back   13
to 1917, and the main article related to labor (Article 123) has experienced only minor 
reforms since. The Federal Labor Law (LFT) was enacted in 1970, and has also 
experienced only minor reforms, mostly in the direction of increasing the mandated 
benefits for workers and reducing the flexibility with which labor can be employed. This 
law was written back when the economy in Mexico was mostly closed to external 
competition and foreign direct investment was limited, following the prescriptions of the 
import substitution model. In this context, it made sense, from a redistributive point of 
view, to have a labor legislation generous towards the employees since firms had rents to 
be shared. Of course, whether a generous labor legislation is the best way of extracting 
rents and redistributing them is highly disputable. Nevertheless, many of the rents that 
existed under a closed economy have disappeared since 1985, when the country began a 
trade liberalization process by joining the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT). Today, Mexico has a mostly open economy, and has signed free trade 
agreements with the U.S., Canada, the European Union, and fourteen other countries. 
Thus, to the extent that Mexico competes with Asian countries to attract FDI, all of which 
have more flexible labor markets, the current labor laws and regulations have become a 
binding constraint for those firms and industries that compete on a global scale. The same 
is true of the United States, Mexico’s largest trading partner and the final destination of 
over 85% of Mexican exports, which has an “at will” hiring and firing policy and one of 
the most flexible labor markets in the world. 
 
It is important to underscore that some of the features of the labor market in Mexico may 
be the result of an explicit legal regulation, in contrast to other countries in which they 
may be the result of an implicit arrangement or of social convention. This is the case, for 
example, of the prohibition in the Mexican labor legislation to lower nominal wages 
(LFT, Article 51). In particular, a worker whose nominal wage or benefits have been 
reduced can take legal action against his or her employer and request for compensation as 
if he or she had been dismissed without just cause. Thus, while nominal wage rigidities 
are a well known —albeit little understood— fact in other labor markets, in Mexico one 
only has to look at the law to find its origin. One particularly detrimental aspect of the 
way in which the current labor regulations operate is the irreversibility of the rigidities   14
induced (a sort of ratchet effect). This is, once an inefficiency or rigidity is introduced 
into the labor market through the law, there is little or no possibility of going back and 
renegotiating it, even if the firm faces the threat of bankruptcy. One example of this 
ratchet effect is the legal prohibition to reduce any wage or non-wage benefits. Thus, 
while gradual increments in wages and other non-wage benefits over any pair of 
consecutive years may not be binding for any particular firm or industry, the average 
differences between an extended period may become burdensome and may be impossible 
to revert. 
 
Another important aspect of labor legislation is how it interacts with other laws and 
regulations, and particularly with the bankruptcy law (Ley de Concursos Mercantiles). 
Since past due wages, severance payments and seniority premiums are usually some of 
the biggest components of a firm’s contingent liabilities, and labor has the highest 
priority claims in case of bankruptcy (LFT, Article 113), the current labor legislation may 
prevent inefficient firms from shutting down or may unnecessarily delay an inevitable 
bankruptcy procedure. As stressed by the literature on labor reallocation, these 
regulations may become an important barrier to the efficient entry and exit of firms, 
which is one of the main sources of productivity growth in the economy. 
 
Another important institutional detail of the Mexican economy is the widespread use and 
incidence of minimum wages. In addition to being a minimum wage in the traditional 
sense (with which firms may or may not comply), many contracts use the minimum wage 
and minimum wage increases as an index. Many union contracts explicitly use the 
minimum wage as an indexing device for wages and many firms and workers implicitly 
use the minimum wage in their bargaining. In this sense, the minimum wage in Mexico is 
really more than a minimum wage: it is a benchmark commonly used to index contracts. 
 
In summary, the current labor legislation and regulations in Mexico and the benefits they 
mandate makes it costly for firms to hire and fire employees and to modify the working 
conditions. Furthermore, these regulations introduce a high degree of uncertainty for 
potential firms or employers when making entry and hiring decisions. One of the results   15
of these rigidities is that they prevent or limit firm from rapidly adjusting their factor 
demands to new economic shocks. As stressed above, the efficient reallocation of 
productive factors across firms and industries is one of the main sources of productivity 
growth in the economy. 
 
5. Simple Statistics 
 
We begin by presenting some simple statistics from our data. For each quarter in the 
years 1986- 2001 we restrict the sample to those workers who were employed in the same 
firm four quarters (one year) earlier. For these workers, we calculated the percent with 
exactly the same nominal salary they had four quarters earlier. We present a chart with 
these results below. 
Figure 1: Percent of employees with no change 













































































































































































There are at least two striking features of this chart. One is that there are three quarters 
that look dramatically different from the rest. Specifically, the percent of workers with 
exactly the same nominal salary as four quarters earlier was extremely high in the fourth 
quarters of 1992, 1997, and 1999. While one might be tempted to dismiss these 
observations as measurement error, the explanation is quite simple and confirms the   16
accuracy of the wage data. A new minimum wage was implemented on November 11, 
1991 and was not changed until January 1, 1993. Therefore, when we compare a 
worker’s wage on December 31, 1992 to the worker’s salary on December 31, 1991, we 
know that the minimum wage had not changed during this period. We can explain the 
apparent anomalies in the fourth quarters of 1997 and 1999 similarly. This feature is the 
result of the high fraction of workers earning the minimum wage, as well as of the fact 
that many firms use the minimum wage as a reference when taking wage increase 
decisions. We will address this point later in this section. 
 
The second noteworthy feature of the above graph is that the percent of workers with no 
change in the nominal salary after four quarters was increasing until about 1995 and has 
been decreasing since. We now contrast these trends with the trends of the percent of 
workers with nominal wage increases and with nominal wage decreases. We present 
these graphs below. 
Figure 2: Percent of employees with a decrease 
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Figure 3: Percent of employees with an increase 















































































































































































We focus particularly on the trends since 1995. Note that the percent of workers 
receiving nominal-wage decreases has been increasing since 1995, as is the percent of 
workers receiving nominal-wage increases. One might interpret these trends as evidence 
that nominal wage rigidities have become less pronounced in recent years. 
 
Given that the data on wages are capped above and below, we next depict the fractions of 
workers with an increase, a decrease and no change in their nominal wage since the 
previous year in a single graph. The first one excludes those workers whose wage is more 
than 9 times the minimum wage (Figure 4). Recall that the wage cap was 10 times the 
minimum wage prior to 1995 and was subsequently raised to 25 times the minimum 
wage. The second graph excludes both those workers earning less than 2 times the 
minimum wage and those workers whose wage is capped above (Figure 5).    18
Figure 4: Percent of employees with an increase, decrease and no 
change in salary since the previous year, excluding workers whose 






























































































































































































Increase (left axis) Decrease (right axis) No change (right axis)
 
 
Figure 5: Percent of employees with an increase, decrease and no 
change in salary since the previous year, excluding workers whose 































































































































































































Increase (left axis) Decrease (right axis) No change (right axis)
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As can be seen, the exclusion of those workers whose wages are capped above makes no 
difference in terms of the behavior over time of the different fractions. In contrast, 
excluding those workers whose wage is capped below at the minimum wage clearly 
eliminates the spikes during the last quarters of 1992, 1997 and 1999. Nevertheless, the 
trends before and after 1995 in the fractions of workers who experience a nominal wage 
decrease or a nominal wage increase are still clearly visible, while the increase in the 
fraction of workers experiencing a nominal wage decrease is more evident now. Thus, as 
will be argued below, the results of this paper are not affected by the inclusion or 
exclusion of workers whose wages are capped. 
 
We now turn to looking at some kernel-density estimates of the probability density 
function of changes in the log wage (see Appendix A for the kernel densitiy estimates of 
each quarter). We present below a graph with a kernel density of the changes in the log 
wages between the third quarter (actually September 30) of 1999 and the fourth quarter of 
2000. 
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One vertical line signals where a nominal change of zero is located on the horizontal axis. 
There definitely appears to be a spike in the density at this point. The other vertical line 
signals that the change in the log of the minimum wage from September 30, 1999 to 
September 30, 2000 was 0.0959. It seems clear that the density has a larger spike at this 
point. The densities of the changes in log wages for all quarters have this same feature. 
 
The simplest explanation many log-wage changes being exactly the change in the log of 
the minimum wage turns out to be the correct one—a substantial number of workers in 
the IMSS data earn exactly the minimum wage. If we look at other periods, however, this 
simple explanation is not complete. Below we present a kernel-density estimate of the 
distribution of log-wage changes from September 30, 1986 to September 30, 1987. We 
eliminate, however, all workers who earned less then two times the minimum wage in 
1986. We also eliminated those who earned more than nine times the minimum wage.
5 
 















                                                 
5 In this period, wages were top coded at ten times the minimum wage.   21
The above figure is representative of the results we observe in the late 1980s. We find 
substantial evidence that wage changes are indexed to changes in the minimum wage, 
even for those earning substantially more than the minimum wage.
6 That is, the largest 
spike in the distribution of log wages is exactly the change in the log of the minimum 
wage. This effect has been called the “lighthouse effect” in earlier work. For the rest of 
the paper, however, we will focus on the distribution log wage changes for all wage 
earners. That is, we will treat wage rigidities that arise from workers earning the 
minimum wage as a phenomenon to be estimated and studied. 
 
We conclude with one more kernel density estimate. It might be interesting to look at one 
of the three periods when the same minimum wage applied in both periods. Below we 
present the kernel density estimate of changes in the log wage between December 31, 
1998 and December 31, 1999.  
 















                                                 
6 Kernel-density estimates from all periods are available upon request.   22
 
In this case, the density looks smooth throughout with the exception of one large spike at 
zero. Thus, this spike in the density encompasses three phenomena: nominal-wage 
changes of zero are common, the high fraction of minimum-wage earners and the fact 
that nominal-wage changes proportional to the change in the minimum wage are common 
too. We interpret the above estimates as evidence of the indexation or lighthouse effect of 
minimum wages in the Mexican labor market. 
 
 
6. Tests of DNWR 
We now turn to some of the formal tests of Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity (DNWR) 
that have been proposed in the literature.  
The Kahn Test (kahn) 
This test, proposed by Kahn (1997), consists of two parameters that are estimated through 
a system of r seemingly unrelated equations (SURE). Each equation uses the fraction of 
wage changes located at the region between r and r-1 percentage points below the median 
as a dependent variable (propt
r). A constant (p
r) and a set of dummy variables indicating 
the histogram bar’s position at (dzerot
r) or below zero (dnegt
r) are the equation’s 
explanatory variables. The parameter n measures the proportion in which the bars 
containing negative wage changes are cut due to DNWR (if n=0 there is no DNWR and if 
it n<0 there is DNWR) and z measures the proportion in which the bar containing zero 
wage changes is increased due to long term contracts, menu costs, or other reasons for 
accumulating observations there (z>0). The size of r depends on the range where the r
th 
bars are more likely to lie above or below zero across time because this raises the test’s 
power. Trials for r=15, 20 and 25 suggested that r=15 provides the soundest estimates. 
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The Augmented Kahn Test (aug. kahn) 
An augmented version of the Kahn test further distinguishes observations located at the 
bars within -1, 0 and 1 percentage points, adding robustness to noise around zero to the 
parameters (provided that there is enough variation in the dummy variables). This 

























































1 ) 1 ( 1 ) (
1 ) 1 ( 1 ) (
1 ) 1 ( 1 ) (
1 ) 1 ( 1 ) (
t t t t
j























t j t t
dneg np dzero z dneg np p prop
dneg p n dzero np z dneg np p prop
dpos np dneg p n dzero p n z dneg np p prop
dpos p n dneg p n dzero p n z dneg np p prop
dpos p n dneg p n dzero p n z dneg np p prop
dpos p n dneg p n dzero p n z dneg np p prop
δ
δ θ
δ θ δ θ
δ θ δ θ
δ θ δ θ
δ θ δ θ
− + + =
− − + + =
− − − − − + + =
− − − − − + + =
− − − − − + + =













   24
where the 
r
t dneg1  indicates that the r




th histogram bar is located at +1 percent. The new parameters are the fraction of 
observations included in the bar that contains zero (θ), in the bar that contains -1 percent 
(δ), and in the bar containing +1 percent (1-θ-δ). Notice that when θ=1 and δ=0 this 
system collapses to the previous one. 
A Kahn Test that considers the effect of the minimum wage 
As mentioned before, the distributions of annual nominal wage changes constructed with 
the IMSS data display another noticeable accumulation point. This point corresponds to 
the increase of the nominal minimum wage. A simple first approximation to analyze this 
pattern consists on adding to the simple Kahn test a couple of parameters that measure 
the proportion in which the bars containing wage changes that are lower than the 
minimum wage change are reduced (n ˆ ) and the proportion in which the bar containing 
the minimum wage change is increased due to indexation (z ˆ ). The first of them is 
associated to a dummy variable indicating the histogram bar’s position below the 
minimum wage (dmwlowt
r), while the second one to a dummy variable indicating the 
histogram bar’s position at the minimum wage change (dmwt
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A menu cost interpretation suggests that the parameter z ˆ of this test should have a positive 
sign, as the original z has. But what sign should n ˆ  have is less obvious. 
An augmented version of this test that distinguishes noise around the zero and the 
minimum wage change can be estimated through the addition to the system of the dummy 
variables 
r
t dneg1,  
r
t dpos1,  
r
t dmwlow1 , and 
r
t dmwhigh1 . The last two dummies indicate 
histogram bars located at -1 percent and +1 percent from the minimum wage change, 
respectively. The new SURE is: 
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On the other hand, we observed that during the periods of high inflation in 1986-1988 
and 1995-1997 the bar of the zero wage change was more than 15 percentage points 
below the median wage change. In addition, several times during those episodes the 
nominal minimum wage increased at an annual rate higher than 15 percent. So in order 
that the model could capture both considerations and still preserve sufficient variation in 
the explanatory variables, instead of just including more 1 percent bars below the median 
into the sure, we made a twofold modification. We changed the reference point of the test 
from the 50
th percentile to the 75
th percentile and increased the size of the bars from 1 to 




The results of various specifications are presented below. We begin with two tables, both 
of which use data from the entire period 1986:1 – 2001:4. The first table uses the median 
of the wage-change distribution as the reference point with histogram-bar widths of one 
percent. The second table uses the 75
th percentile of the wage-change distribution as the 
reference point with histogram-bar widths of 4 percent 
 
 
Kahn Test (15) Kahn-MW Test (15) Aug. Kahn Test (15) Aug. Kahn-MW Test (15)
n -0.621704 -1.907306 -0.59952 -4.149272
-12.52097 -9.901403 -10.86027 -5.635791
z 0.115069 0.097394 0.114935 0.104938













t-tests are reported in italics.
All wage earners bar size 1% and reference point = 50% percentile, 1986:1-2001:4
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Kahn Test (15) Kahn-MW Test (15) Aug. Kahn Test (15) Aug. Kahn-MW Test (15)
n -0.351025 -0.602996 -0.225539 -0.566772
-12.14983 -24.78789 -3.652934 -18.1557
z 0.082473 0.070989 0.071045 0.067879













t-tests are reported in italics.




Qualitatively the results were similar across specifications. Histogram bars that 
encompass changes in the log wage of either zero or the change in the log of the 
minimum wage are both estimated to be higher than they would in the absence of menu 
costs or long term contracting. (This can be seen from the two “z” parameters). 
Histogram bars that encompass reductions in the nominal wage are estimated to be 
smaller as a result of nominal-wage rigidities. This result is consistent with studies from 
other countries. It is in this sense that we do find evidence of downward nominal-wage 
rigidities. 
 
Histogram bars are estimated to be larger when they encompass changes in the log wage 
that are lower than the increase in log of the minimum wage (but above zero). One 
possible explanation is that workers who had been earning slightly more than the 
minimum wage receiving salary increases sufficient to reach the new minimum wage.  
 
There is ample reason to suspect that wage rigidities might be waning over time. The 
early years of the sample were characterized by high inflation, making wage indexation a 
more pressing concern for workers. Furthermore, the fact that the economy was   28
substantially less open to trade in the early years might lead one to suspect that the wage 
distribution would be less flexible. To address this point, we present tables where we 
divide our sample into two sub periods: 1986:1-1993:4 and to 1994:1-2001:4. We present 
these results below, using both the median and the 75
th percentile as reference points. 
 
Kahn Test (15) Kahn-MW Test (15) Aug. Kahn Test (15) Aug. Kahn-MW Test (15)
n -0.61345 -3.803634 -0.675887 -22.83584
-6.571289 -7.40371 -5.93254 -1.198701
z 0.123182 0.096047 0.122481 0.120509













t-tests are reported in italics.
All wage earners bar size 1% and reference point = 50% percentile, 1986:1-1993:4
 
Kahn Test (15) Kahn-MW Test (15) Aug. Kahn Test (15) Aug. Kahn-MW Test (15)
n -0.524213 -1.344846 -0.53489 -1.16683
-13.50863 -7.966568 -11.50597 -6.565205
z 0.111933 0.09637 0.111565 0.094723













t-tests are reported in italics.
All wage earners bar size 1% and reference point = 50% percentile, 1994:1-2001:4
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Kahn Test (15) Kahn-MW Test (15) Aug. Kahn Test (15) Aug. Kahn-MW Test (15)
n -0.519337 -0.744329 0.004611 -0.595871
-15.5048 -17.03895 0.050463 -10.09873
z 0.070744 0.064836 0.062415 0.067647













t-tests are reported in italics.
All wage earners bar size 4% and reference point = 75% percentile, 1986:1-1993:4
 
 
Kahn Test (15) Kahn-MW Test (15) Aug. Kahn Test (15) Aug. Kahn-MW Test (15)
n 0.119167 -0.365532 0.582731
1.053752 -6.240649 2.631036












t-tests are reported in italics.




When we break the sample period 1986:1-2001:4 into two sub-samples corresponding to 
1986:1-1993:4 and to 1994:1-2001:4, we indeed find evidence that nominal-wage 
rigidities have become less important over time, as have the effects of minimum wages. 
We do not find evidence that “bunching” of log-wage changes has diminished (the z 
parameters do not appear weaker to be less important in the later period). We do find, 
however, that the positive effects on histogram bars encompassing positive changes in the   30
log wage less than the change in the log minimum wage have attenuated over time. We 
also find that the negative effects on histogram bars encompassing reductions in the 
nominal wage have attenuated over time. It is in this sense that the distribution of changes 
of log wages appears to be more flexible in more recent years. Changes in log wages 
appear to be less affected both by minimum wages and by nominal-wage rigidities.  
 
Reductions of the magnitudes of the “n” parameters after 1994 accord well with the fact 
that indexation was more prevalent during the years of the inflation stabilization plans 
than afterwards.
7 Substantial wage indexation as part of stabilization plans has been 
reported for other Latin American economies like Chile (Cortázar, 1997), Argentina 
(Pessino, 1997), and Brazil (Devereaux, 1994).
8 Less flexibility downwards in the former 
period than in the latter is reflected in less negative values for the corresponding n 
parameters. However, even with more liberalized trade, in the absence of any labor law 




We studied the distributions of changes in the log of wages for tax-registered employees 
in the private sector in Mexico. In particular, we focused on employees who do not 
change firms from one year to the next. We found it common that the nominal wage does 
not change from one year to the next. We also found it common that a change in the log 
wage is equal to the change in the log of the minimum wage. This latter finding is driven 
                                                 
7 Aspe (1993) describes that in Mexico one of the main objectives of stabilization plan adopted during the 
late eighties and early nineties was to correct wage momentum. Agreements with the workers focused on 
moving away from short-term contracts with complete ex-post indexation toward longer contracts defined 
in terms of expected inflation (ex ante indexation). To this end, in December 1987 there was an immediate 
minimum wage rise of 15 percent during December of 1987 and a 20 percent rise in January 1988, 
followed by a monthly review according to anticipated inflation. The period for the review shifted from a 
monthly to a yearly basis within a few months. 
 
8 For instance, Cortázar (1997) reports that in Chile, during the period of 1973-79, the military government 
replaced decentralized negotiations between entrepreneurs and workers with a policy of wage 
readjustments determined by government authorities. The rate of variation of nominal wages (around their 
medium-term trend) throughout those years was basically an exogenous variable determined by the central 
authorities. Equations estimated to test the hypothesis that the percentage of growth of nominal wages can 
be expressed as a fraction of the percentage wage readjustment decreed by the government during this 
period yields coefficient for this variable higher than 90 percent.   31
both by employees earning exactly the minimum wage as well as by the fact that wage 
contracts for those earning more than the minimum wage use the minimum wage as an 
index. We further estimate that wage changes are bunched in the region between the two 
benchmarks (zero and the increase in the log minimum wage), while reductions in the 
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10. Appendix A 
 
The following figures depict the kernel density estimates of the probability density 
functions of the change in the log nominal age for each quarter between March 31, 1986, 
and December 31, 2001. As before, the first vertical line signals where the nominal 
change of zero is located on the horizontal axis while the second vertical line signals the 
change in the log of the minimum wage from each quarter. Several features are apparent 
from these graphs. First, as mentioned above, in almost every case there are two large 
spikes in the density function, one at the zero change in the nominal wage and another 
one at the minimum wage change. The only three exceptions are the densities 
corresponding to December 31, 1992, December 31, 1997, and December 31, 1999. In 
these cases there is a large spike at the point corresponding to zero change in the nominal 
wage, but not to the point corresponding to the minimum wage increase. As explained 
above, these dates correspond to periods the where the same minimum wage from the 
year before was in effect. Another interesting feature of these graphs is that there are 
always observations to the left of the zero change in nominal wages, which implies that 
some of the workers are experiencing nominal wage decreases. Finally, it is interesting to 
observe the evolution of these densities over time, and how the distance between the zero 
and the minimum nominal wage increases grew closer up to the first quarter of 1995, then 
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11. Appendix B 
 
Some International Evidence on DNWR: United States, Canada and Australia 
 Country United States  Canada  Australia 
 Statistic  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
n of kahn's test  -0.47  -0.47  -1.00    -0.92 
z of kahn's test  4.43  9.98       
n of augmented kahn's test    -0.47       
z of augmented kahn's test    9.98       
% obs added at zero (θ   1.00      
% obs added at bar above zero (1-θ-δ)   0.00      
% obs added at bar below zero (δ)   0.00      
% Rigid wage observations  10.6  17.9  6.8  13.00  14.70 
% Nominal cut observations  11.9  14.4  0.1  2.30  3.50 
1 PSID wage earners only, Lebow Stockton and Wascher (1995) 
2 ECI wage and salary earners 1991-1998, Lebow, Saks and Wilson (2003) 
3 Firm 2’s dataset of salary earners who stay in the job, Wilson (2002) 
4 Human Resources Development Canada data of private sector settlements, Crawford and Seamus (1999) 
5. Mercer Cullen Egan Dell surveys of remuneration, Dwyer and Leong (2000) 
 
 




All wage earners Wage earners who 
stay in the same 
job 
Wage earners who 
stay in the same job 
at the formal sector 
      
n of kahn's test  -.089 -0.07  -0.11 
z of kahn's test  2.91 3.74  3.58 
n of augmented kahn's test  n.s. .07  n.s. 
z of augmented kahn's test  3.01 3.79  3.76 
% obs added at zero (θ)      
% obs added at bar above zero (1-θ-δ)      
% obs added at bar below zero (δ)      
% Rigid wage observations  7.74 9.32  7.60 
% Nominal cut observations  24.16 22.83  22.40 
1. Source: Castellanos (2003). 
 